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tory of this section and a full analysis of its possibilities have been
set out in an earlier issue of this REVIEW. 1 7 In the present case, the
defendant purchaser was held personally liable for the principal
debt because he had not obtained the appropriate affidavit, despite
the fact that the plaintiff mortgagee had not recorded the chattel
mortgage, and regardless of a possible disparity between the
amount of the principal debt and the current value of the automobile involved.
The result of this statute goes far beyond that contemplated
by the system of mortgage. While agreeing with the purpose of
protecting the chattel mortgagee and deterring fraud or abuse
by third persons, one might well consider it pertinent for the
Legislature to re-examine this statutory provision with a view to
giving the warranted protection to one interest without unduly
harming the other.
SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS AND
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
In the Succession of Gumbell Mr. Gumbel had made Touro
Infirmary his residuary legatee. Later, at a time when he was
too ill to prepare another codicil, he wrote the President of Touro
Infirmary asking that certain changes be made in connection with
the devolution of his property after his death. The president
acceded to this request and the Board of Directors of Touro
Infirmary by resolution passed after Mr. Gumbel's death confirmed the president's action. Later, the executor petitioned the
court for an order to carry out all wishes of the deceased, including those mentioned in his letter to the President of Touro. All
legatees joined in the petition except Touro Infirmary, which had
previously passed the resolution. The court granted the order
and then one of the legatees who had signed the petition attacked
the order, stating that previously she had been unaware of her
rights and had been mistaken in the belief that her legacy would
be unaffected by the agreement with Touro Infirmary. Although
the executor showed that sufficient funds had been retained to
protect her legacy, she entered opposition to the executor's provisional account. Obviously the agreement was neither a will nor
17. Note, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 516 (1952).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. 220 La. 266, 56 So. 2d 418 (1951).
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a binding contract (even assuming that such an agreement could
under certain circumstances produce the desired legal effect),
for here the board did not affirm the president's action until after
Mr. Gumbel's death. However, as was held by the court, the
agreement entered into by the legatees was supported by a
natural obligation, that of carrying out the wishes of the deceased
expressed in his letter to the president. Moreover, the bequest
to the opposing legatee was not altered and was well secured. It
appeared that this legatee was attempting to get a cash settlement
instead of the annuity which the testator desired her to have, for
no other purpose could logically have been found for her
opposition.
In Carr v. Hart2 bequests to a "cemetery fund" fell for lack
of a legally capable recipient.
In Succession of Harrison3 the court held that the trial judge
had the right to revoke his order to sell succession property,
before sale had been effected, upon proper showing of cause.
The case of Succession of LeJeune4 is of particular interest,
as it purports to clarify at least one of the cloudy areas in the
conflict between community property and the separate property
of the wife. The Houghton-Hall5 interpretation of Act 186 of 1920,
amending Article 2334 of the Civil Code, established that a wife's
earnings from a business, trade, occupation or industry conducted
separate from that of her husband are not her separate property
except when she is living separate and apart from her husband.
The actual meaning of "living separate and apart although not
separated by judgment of court" was never too clearly outlined.
In the instant case the following statement appears:
"It is manifest that the type of separate living contemplated
by Article 2334 of the Civil Code is the same sort of voluntary separation, that is, the intentional establishment of a
separate abode in different premises, which is deemed essential under Act 430 of 1938 (The so-called two year act) L.S.A.
-R.S. 9:301, in an action for divorce."6
Since the property in question in the instant case had been
purchased during the marriage, the presumption of community
had to be rebutted. The sisters of the deceased wife, claiming as
2.
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6.
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57 So. 2d 739 (1952).
57 So. 2d 742 (1952).
59 So. 2d 446 (1952).
148 So. 37 (1933).
59 So. 2d 446, 449 (1952).
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against the husband, could not establish the property as separate
by merely showing that when it was purchased the husband was
living in the garage while the wife lived in the rooming house
which she ran. She allegedly earned the money for the purchase
of the property while actually living separate and apart, but the
purchase was entirely on credit.
In Succession of Pujol v. Manning,7 an olographic will was
attacked on the ground of forgery. Some evidence was introduced
that testator could not write, but the will was upheld on the
basis, of strong evidence not only of handwriting but also of testimony by persons who claimed actually to have seen the testator
write the will in question.
In Uchello v. Uchellos alimony pendente lite was said to be a
debt for which the husband, not the community, is ordinarily
responsible. However, pleadings seemed to have contemplated
that income from community property was to be used for this
purpose; hence the wife was held not entitled to "double payment."
. The court in Nix v. Berniard9 found that an administratrix in
employing an attorney had no right to contract to give him an
interest in the property in litigation. The attorney's fee was fixed
on a quantum meruit basis, and an estimate of one-third of the
value of the property was awarded.
0
testator had imposed a trust for
In Succession of Earhart'
ten years upon his property and had purported by reference to
incorporate Act 107 of 1920 into his will. This act had been
repealed even at the time of the making of the will. However,
Act 81 of 1938, permitting the establishment of trusts, was in
effect when the will was made and at the death of the testator.
Hence, the court, guided by the articles of the code dealing with
interpretation of wills and honoring the intent of the testator,
found that while mention of Act 107 of 1920 must be disregarded,
the intent of the author of the will might be carried out under
the later act. Opponents made an attack on the constitutionality
of the trust act, based upon the prohibition against abolishing
forced heirship. The court pointed out that in the same provision
of the Constitution" which forbids the abolition of forced heir-

7. 221 La. 466, 59 So. 2d 456 (1952).
8. 220 La. 1061, 58 So. 2d 385 (1952).
9. 220 La. 688, 57 So. 2d 230 (1952).
10. 220 La. 817, 57 So. 2d 695 (1952).
11. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 16.
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ship, authority is granted the Legislature to creat trust estates
for a period not exceeding ten years after the death of the
donor. It was therefore found that the framers of the Constitution contemplated that creation of trusts was not the abolishment
of forced heirship.
The court held in Succession of McGeory,12 citing Doll v.
Dol 3 for a full discussion of the problem, that collation may not
be sought "after the donor's succession has been closed by judgment placing the heirs in possession, thus changing their status
from co-heirs to mere co-owners." An annulment of the judgment
would be necessary before a plea for collation could be entertained. Ex parte proceedings to procure an order for a supplemental inventory would not suffice.
1

Designation of a payee by a purchaser of United States Bonds
was said in Winsberg v. Winsberg14 to constitute a gift made in
contemplation of death, which must bear the state inheritance
tax. While not a testament, such a designation is a substitute
therefor and thus subject to the indirect application of Article
1705, providing that a testament is revoked by the birth of a
child. Obviously, Louisiana cannot force payment to other than
the named recipient in a contract with the United States, but it
can insist that the beneficiary pay the equivalent sum to the
estate or heir of the donor.
Principles of community property are applied in the Succession of Schnitter15 in determining the nature of the deceased
wife's property in contest between the husband, who in absence
of ascendants or descendants would inherit the wife's share of
the community, and the wife's collateral relatives, who would
inherit her separate property. When proof disclosed that certain
parcels of land bought by the wife in her name had been paid
for with her separate funds, even though no recitation of this
fact was found in the deed, the title was properly declared to rest
in her separate estate. In regard to the item "Prytania Street
Property," the rule laid down is less favorable to the wife, and
it is stated that unless all of the funds applied to the purchase
are proved to have been the separate property of the wife, title
would rest in the community, with only a debt due from that
12. 220 La. 391, 56 So. 2d 727 (1951).
13. 206 La. 550, 19 So. 2d 249 (1944).

14. 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952).
15. 220 La. 323, 56 So. 2d 563 (1951).
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mass to the separate estate for the amount proved to have been
separate. Moreover, it was intimated that the power of the husband as administrator of the wife's separate estate permitted
investment of her separate funds in his hands to produce a community title. If that is a correct interpretation of the expressions
found, this power would seem to go beyond the ordinary understanding of the word administrator.
The case of Oliphint v. Oliphint0 makes a most careful review
of evidence to determine whether or not a husband immediately
before and after dissolution of the community had disposed of or
concealed, by stock transfer or otherwise, property with a view
towards depriving his wife of her proper share of the community. Moreover, the husband's account of the debts owed was
reviewed and the case was remanded in order that more information on that score could be uncovered. So far as the law of community property is concerned, the most interesting point of the
case had to do with Article 2404's limitation of the power of the
husband to donate property of the community. The article recites
among other things that the husband may not donate a "quota"
of the movables. This provision has not hitherto been interpreted
by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Justice McCaleb (author of
the majority opinion, from which there was no dissent, except as
to a point of practice) concluded that the word "quota" meant a
"proportional part or share" and was synonymous with "fraction"
or "percentage," and did not forbid the gift of specific movables,
such as shares of stock. It would appear that this interpretation
is indeed the only logical one. Thus the lack of protection of the
wife's part of the community under present law is again pointed
out, as it was in the Succession of Geagan, 7 referred to in this
case. Our Supreme Court has now twice suggested that the
Legislature should correct this situation. The need would seem
to be particularly great at the present time, when there is such
a great investment in movables and when an ever-increasing
number of wives are working outside their homes with their
earnings flowing to the community.
The case of Coney v. Coney"8 appeared before the Supreme
Court for the fourth time and had to be remanded for determina16. 219 La. 781, 54 So. 2d 18 (1951).
17. 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947).
18. 220 La. 473, 56 So. 2d 841 (1951).
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tion of value of the community, for the audits submitted gave
the court little assistance in connection with the issue. Many
"incongruities" in the statement offered were pointed out. It was
noted that a husband might give his wife a gift during marriage.
Hence a $5,000 diamond ring was declared her separate property.
Since the husband had not admitted certain luggage to have been
a gift but contended that it was purchased during marriage with
his separate funds, it was presumed to be community property.
Sonnier v. Fris' 9 maintains that an attempt to effect a voluntary separation of property between husband and wife not judicially separated is null under Article 2427, as are other contracts
not falling under the exceptions envisioned by Article 1790.
In Lewis v. Clay,2° a mother had made an authentic "act of
sale" of certain property to her son and the instrument contained
a recitation of consideration. The transaction was made after the
son's marriage to defendant, and before defendant obtained a
judgment of separation against the son. After the community
was thus dissolved, the mother and son confected an instrument
labeled a "revocation of donation," wherein the parties declared
that the first transactiori was a donation and further that they
intended now to replace title in the mother. The Supreme Court
found this document inadmissible for any purpose in this litigation. The presumption of community was not rebuttable by a
private act of the husband which would affect his wife's interest.
Neither was parol, evidence of intent to donate admissible to "substitute . . .a contract of a dissimilar nature."'21 Error was also
pleaded; the contention was not that plaintiff believed the act of
transfer to have been a donation instead of a sale, but that she
had taken bad advice from an attorney when she had allowed
the sale form to be used. This type of error was found not to fall
within the protection of Article 1821.
In Almond v. Adams 22 the court held that an alleged donation
from a father to his son and to the latter's wife fell as a radical
nullity because it purported to give an immovable and reserve
the usufruct. An attempt to support it as a remunerative donation failed for lack of proof.
19. 220 La. 1085, 58 So. 2d 393 (1952).
20. 60 So. 2d 78 (La. 1952).
21. 60 So. 2d 78, 81.
22. 221 La. 234, 59 So. 2d 132 (1952).

